Personal Injury

Maryland Court Discusses the Apparent Manufacturer Doctrine in Asbestos Case

August 10, 2016 | by Foran & Foran, P.A.

In a recent decision, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reviewed an asbestos case involving the death of an employee from mesothelioma. In Stein v. Pfizer, Inc. (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 31, 2016), the employee worked as a bricklayer, using asbestos-containing cement in completing projects for his employer. After the employee’s death, his family and estate brought negligence and other liability claims against several defendants, including the parent company of the cement product’s manufacturer, alleging that it was an apparent manufacturer and therefore liable for the illness and death of the employee.

In Stein, the estate argued that the defendant held itself out as a manufacturer of the asbestos-containing cement because its trademark was in advertisements and promotional materials for the product. The defendant argued that it was a separate corporation from its subsidiary, that none of the manufacturer’s employees held positions with the defendant, and that only a few of the defendant’s employees sat on the manufacturer’s board of directors. The defendant’s motion for summary judgment was granted by the trial court, which found that, under all of the circumstances, a reasonable person could not conclude from the documents that the defendant was the manufacturer of the product at issue. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.

The Court of Special Appeals examined the history and case law pertaining to the apparent manufacturer doctrine, which holds a non-manufacturer liable for a defective product based on its conduct. The court went on to note that there are three tests for determining whether an entity may be found to be an apparent manufacturer, although Maryland case law does not specify which test is to be applied. Nevertheless, the court concluded that under all three tests, the defendant would not be deemed an apparent manufacturer of the asbestos-containing cement.

Maryland Court Affirms Verdict for Plaintiff in Car Accident Case

June 15, 2016 | by Foran & Foran, P.A.

In a recent decision, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals considered whether damages were fairly awarded to an injured plaintiff based on the provided jury instructions. In Lawrence v. Henry (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 4, 2016), the plaintiff was injured in a car accident caused by the defendant’s negligent driving. After the trial, the jury awarded approximately $49,000 in damages to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff sought review from the Court of Special Appeals, contending that the trial court erred in denying jury instructions on susceptibility to injury and aggravation of a previous condition, and in preventing the plaintiff’s counsel from arguing that his injuries were permanent. The plaintiff argued that the jury’s low award of non-economic damages indicated prejudice caused by the court’s decisions.

The Court of Special Appeals initially found that both of the plaintiff’s objections had not been preserved for review, and thus they could not be appealed. Nevertheless, the court went on to find that, even if the objection to the jury instructions was preserved for review, it would be without merit. The court explained that it considers the following factors when deciding whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying a request for a particular jury instruction: (1) whether the requested instruction was a correct statement of the law; (2) whether it was applicable under the facts of the case; and (3) whether it was fairly covered in the instructions actually given. In Lawrence, the dispute centered around whether the instructions were applicable under the facts of the case.

Maryland Court Evaluates Circumstantial Evidence in Lead Paint Case

June 12, 2016 | by Foran & Foran, P.A.

In a recent opinion, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland addressed the issue of whether summary judgment against the plaintiff was properly granted in a lead paint case. In Griffin v. Jontiff (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 25, 2016), the plaintiff brought a negligence claim against several defendants, alleging that she sustained personal injuries as a result of exposure to lead-based paint while residing in various properties.

In a Maryland lawsuit alleging exposure to lead-based paint, the plaintiff must show that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, the defendant breached that duty, the plaintiff suffered an actual injury or loss, and the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant’s breach of the duty. To prove the causation element of negligence in a lead paint case, the plaintiff must introduce evidence to establish that the property contained lead-based paint, and that the lead-based paint at the property was a substantial contributor to the plaintiff’s exposure to lead. The plaintiff may prove causation through direct evidence, as well as circumstantial evidence, as long as the circumstantial evidence creates a reasonable likelihood or probability (rather than a possibility) supporting a rational inference of causation, and it is not wholly speculative.

In Griffin, there was no direct evidence of the presence of lead-based paint in the property at issue. The plaintiff, however, argued that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence, based on the fact that she lived at the property for two years, there was no evidence of any significant environmental or other source of exposure to lead at this time, the property contained flaking and chipping paint, and her blood lead levels failed to decline at the expected rate, absent further exposure to lead. The plaintiff also presented testimony from an expert who opined that her elevated lead levels were caused by her exposure to lead in the property at issue.

Maryland Court Finds No Evidence of Dangerous Condition in Premises Liability Case

June 9, 2016 | by Foran & Foran, P.A.

The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland recently ruled on an appeal in a personal injury case that was halted after the court granted a motion for judgment for the defendant at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence at trial. In Bright v. Warehouse Servs., Inc. (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Mar. 28, 2016), the plaintiff was injured while working as a forklift operator in a warehouse operated by the defendant. The plaintiff brought a premises liability action against the defendant, alleging that a defect in a loading ramp caused his forklift to drop, jolting him and resulting in a serious back injury.

The case went to trial. The plaintiff was the only witness to testify about the condition of the defendant’s loading dock. He presented testimony from two medical experts to discuss his damages, although they could not explain what caused the jolt that the plaintiff contended caused his injuries. No witness examined the ramp after the accident to investigate whether it was defective, dangerous, or in need of repair. At the close of evidence, the defendant moved for judgment pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-519. The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant knew of the defect and had the opportunity, if there was a defect, to fix it.

To prove a negligence claim in Maryland, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, the defendant breached that duty, the plaintiff suffered an actual injury or loss, and that loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant’s breach of the duty. Under premises liability law, the duty of care that is owed by the owner of property to one who enters on the property depends upon the entrant’s legal status. Ordinarily, one entering onto the property of another will occupy the status of invitee, licensee by invitation, bare licensee, or trespasser. An invitee is a person on the property for a purpose related to the owner’s business, and is owed a duty of ordinary care to keep the property safe. In Bright, it was undisputed that the plaintiff was a business invitee.

Maryland Court Allows Excess Liability Insurer to Conceal Identity at Trial in Car Accident Case

June 7, 2016 | by Foran & Foran, P.A.

In a recent personal injury case, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland considered whether a trial court erred by concealing the existence of the defendant’s excess liability insurer in a trial to determine liability for a car accident. In Kiknadze v. Sonneman (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 12, 2016), the parties were involved in a car accident. The plaintiff brought a negligence action against the defendant, who was insured by Progressive, and also notified the defendant’s excess liability insurer, State Farm, of a potential underinsured motorist (UIM) claim. The trial court granted State Farm’s motion to intervene in the case and prohibited the disclosure of State Farm’s identity to the jury. After a trial, the jury awarded over $20,000 to the plaintiff, who appealed the decision of the trial court to conceal State Farm’s involvement from the jury.

In Maryland, UIM coverage is designed to provide an injured insured with resources equal to those that would have been available had the tortfeasor carried liability coverage equal to the amount of coverage that the insured purchased from his or her own insurance company. Accordingly, Maryland is a gap theory state, meaning that injured insureds may recover the difference between their UIM coverage and money received from the tortfeasor. Excess coverage, on the other hand, is another form of insurance in which the insurer is liable only for any excess amount of the judgment remaining after the primary insurer has paid up to the limit of its policy. Generally, a UIM claim is brought against one’s own insurer for breach of contract. In most cases, the trial court will not typically exclude the existence of UIM coverage from the jury.

Maryland Court Rules Jury Did Not Err in Finding Child Contributorily Negligent

June 5, 2016 | by Foran & Foran, P.A.

In a recent opinion, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reviewed a personal injury case in Butler v. Abbett (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 5, 2016). In Butler, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit on behalf of their eight-year-old daughter after she was injured while climbing a tree on the defendant’s property. After a trial, the jury found in favor of the defendant. The plaintiffs moved for a new trial, arguing that the evidence showed that the defendant was negligent, and it did not prove that their daughter was contributorily negligent or had assumed the risk of her actions.

In Maryland, the duty owed to a social guest is to exercise reasonable care to make the premises safe or to warn the guest of known dangerous conditions that cannot reasonably be discovered by the guest. The parental duty of supervision includes protecting a child from known or obvious dangers. If a condition is open and obvious, no greater duty is imposed upon a host of a child under parental supervision than would be owed to the parent. On appeal, the court found that the tree was an open and obvious condition, and the defendant was not acting unreasonably in supervising the plaintiffs’ daughter.

Maryland Court Discusses Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Personal Injury Appeal

June 3, 2016 | by Foran & Foran, P.A.

In a recent case, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reviewed a personal injury claim in which a judgment in favor of the defendant was granted by the trial court. In Cohen v. Veolia Transp. Servs., Inc. (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 29, 2016), the plaintiff alleged that she sustained personal injuries while being transported in a mobility van when the motorized scooter on which she was seated tipped over. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s employee was negligent in failing to secure the scooter to the floor of the van. At trial, the plaintiff relied on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to establish a prima facie case of negligence. The trial court held that it did not apply, and it granted the defendant’s motion for judgment at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case.

Res ipsa loquitur allows a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of negligence when direct evidence of the cause of the accident is unavailable, and circumstantial evidence permits the inference that the defendant’s negligence was the cause. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will be available if the accident or injury is one that ordinarily would not occur without negligence on the part of the operator of the vehicle, and the facts are so clear and certain that an inference of negligence arises naturally. In effect, res ipsa loquitur allows the plaintiff to present the question of negligence to the fact-finder, notwithstanding a lack of direct evidence bearing on causation.

Maryland Court Allows Evidence of Superseding Causation in Medical Malpractice Case

June 2, 2016 | by Foran & Foran, P.A.

The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland recently reviewed a medical malpractice case involving issues of admissible evidence to prove superseding negligence. In Copsey v. Park (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 21, 2016), the surviving family of the decedent brought an action against the treating physician, alleging that the defendant negligently misread the decedent’s MRI six days before he suffered a massive, and ultimately fatal, stroke. The trial court allowed the physician-defendant to present evidence of negligence by other physicians who had treated the decedent after the defendant, and then the court instructed the jury on superseding causation at the end of the trial. On appeal, the survivors contended that the circuit court erred in admitting evidence of the negligence of subsequent treating physicians and instructing the jury on superseding causation.

Medical malpractice, or negligence, is the failure of a medical professional to meet the appropriate standard of care when treating a patient. In order to establish medical malpractice, a plaintiff must also prove that the physician’s negligent conduct caused the injury alleged in the lawsuit. In Maryland, courts have held that evidence of both negligence and causation attributable to a non-party is admissible in medical malpractice actions when the defendant asserts a complete denial of liability. In Copsey, the appeals court held that it doesn’t matter whether the alleged third-party negligence occurred before or after the defendant treated the patient, since without such evidence, the jury would be given a materially incomplete picture of the facts, and the defendant would be denied a fair trial. The court therefore found that the lower court did not err in allowing the defendant to present evidence of negligence on the part of other treating physicians.

Maryland Court Affirms Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff in Car Accident Case

March 25, 2016 | by Foran & Foran, P.A.

In a recent decision, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland decided whether summary judgment was appropriate in the case of Farouq v. Curran (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 5, 2016). In Farouq, the plaintiff was struck and injured while waiting at a bus stop by a police vehicle that skidded as a result of wet road conditions. The plaintiff filed suit, alleging that the defendant police officer’s negligence led to the collision and was the cause of her injuries. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the plaintiff lacked sufficient evidence to establish negligence, and the motion was granted by the trial court. The plaintiff subsequently appealed that order.

In Maryland, a finding of negligence requires that the plaintiff allege and prove facts demonstrating that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, that the defendant breached that duty, that the plaintiff suffered an actual injury or loss, and that the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant’s breach of the duty.

In support of its motion for summary judgment, the defendant provided the affidavit of an expert accident reconstructionist who had investigated the scene. The expert reported that the roadway was very slippery and that the potential for loss of control could occur at any speed. In addition, the expert found that the defendant’s speed was approximately 17 miles per hour, which was lower than the posted speed limit of 30 miles per hour. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that since a jury is not required to accept the defendant’s expert testimony, it should not have been taken into consideration by the trial court. The Court of Special Appeals, however, held that a trial court may consider any admissible evidence in deciding a motion for summary judgment.

Maryland Court of Appeals Finds Sufficient Evidence Existed to Submit Plaintiff’s Claims to Jury

March 20, 2016 | by Foran & Foran, P.A.

The Maryland Court of Appeals released a decision in the case of Beall v. Holloway-Johnson, which involved a collision between a police vehicle and a motorcycle, resulting in the death of the motorcyclist. The motorcyclist’s mother brought a wrongful death lawsuit against the police officer and other defendants, claiming negligence, gross negligence, battery, and a violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. At trial, the lower court granted the defendant’s motion for judgment at the close of the plaintiff’s case on all the claims except negligence. The jury returned a $3.5 million verdict for compensatory damages in favor of the plaintiff, which was reduced to $200,000 to comply with the damages cap under the Local Government Tort Claims Act. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals found that there was sufficient evidence to submit the plaintiff’s other claims to the jury, and that the counts alleged might also support an award of punitive damages. The Maryland Court of Appeals subsequently granted a writ of certiorari to consider the questions raised by the parties.

In Maryland, negligence is defined as conduct that falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risks of harm. Gross negligence is more serious, and it occurs when a person inflicts injury intentionally or is so utterly indifferent to the rights of others that the person acts as if such rights did not exist. The distinction can be difficult to establish, since a legally sufficient case of ordinary negligence will frequently be enough to create a jury question of whether such negligence was or was not gross.